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Abstract. In encryption, non-malleability is a highly desirable prop-
erty: it ensures that adversaries cannot manipulate the plaintext by act-
ing on the ciphertext. In [6], Ambainis et al. gave a definition of non-
malleability for the encryption of quantum data. In this work, we show
that this definition is too weak, as it allows adversaries to “inject” plain-
texts of their choice into the ciphertext. We give a new definition of
quantum non-malleability which resolves this problem. Our definition
is expressed in terms of entropic quantities, considers stronger adver-
saries, and does not assume secrecy. Rather, we prove that quantum
non-malleability implies secrecy ; this is in stark contrast to the classical
setting, where the two properties are completely independent. For uni-
tary schemes, our notion of non-malleability is equivalent to encryption
with a two-design (and hence also to the definition of [6]).
Our techniques also yield new results regarding the closely-related
task of quantum authentication. We show that “total authentication”
(a notion recently proposed by Garg et al. [18]) can be satisfied with
two-designs, a significant improvement over the eight-design construction
of [18]. We also show that, under a mild adaptation of the rejection
procedure, both total authentication and our notion of non-malleability
yield quantum authentication as defined by Dupuis et al. [16].
1 Introduction
Background. In its most basic form, encryption ensures secrecy in the presence
of eavesdroppers. Besides secrecy, another desirable property is non-malleability,
which guarantees that an active adversary cannot modify the plaintext by ma-
nipulating the ciphertext. In the classical setting, secrecy and non-malleability
are independent: there are schemes which satisfy secrecy but are malleable, and
schemes which are non-malleable but transmit the plaintext in the clear. If both
secrecy and non-malleability is desired, then pairwise-independent permutations
provide information-theoretically perfect (one-time) security [20]. In the compu-
tational security setting, non-malleability can be achieved by MACs, and ensures
chosen-ciphertext security for authenticated encryption.
In the setting of quantum information, encryption is the task of transmit-
ting quantum states over a completely insecure quantum channel. Information-
theoretic secrecy for quantum encryption is well-understood. Non-malleability,
on the other hand, has only been studied in one previous work, by Ambainis,
Bouda and Winter [6]. Their definition (which we will call ABW-non-malleability,
or ABW-NM) requires that the scheme satisfies secrecy, and that the “effective
channel” Dec ◦ Λ ◦ Enc of any adversary Λ amounts to either the identity map
or replacement by some fixed state. In the case of unitary schemes, ABW-NM
is equivalent to encrypting with a unitary two-design. Unitary two-designs are
a natural quantum analogue of pairwise-independent permutations, and can be
efficiently constructed in a number of ways (see, e.g., [10, 14].)
While quantum non-malleability has only been considered by [6], the closely-
related task of quantum authentication (where decryption is allowed to reject)
has received significant attention (see, e.g., [2, 7, 11, 16, 18].) The widely-adopted
definition of Dupuis, Nielsen and Salvail asks that the averaged effective channel
of any adversary is close to a map which does not touch the plaintext [16]; we
refer to this notion as DNS-authentication. Recent work by Garg, Yuen and
Zhandry [18] established another notion of quantum authentication, which they
call “total authentication.” The notion of total authentication has two major
differences from previous definitions: (i.) it asks for success with high probability
over the choice of keys, rather than simply on average, and (ii.) it makes no
demands whatsoever in the case that decryption rejects. We refer to this notion
of quantum authentication as GYZ-authentication. In [18], it is shown that GYZ-
authentication can be satisfied with unitary eight-designs.
This work. In this work, we devise a new definition of non-malleability (de-
noted NM) for quantum encryption, improving on ABW-NM in a number of
ways. First, our definition is expressed in terms of entropic quantities, which al-
lows us to bring several quantum-information-theoretic techniques to bear (such
as decoupling.) Second, we consider more powerful adversaries, which can pos-
sess side information about the plaintext. Third, we remove the possibility of a
“plaintext injection” attack, whereby an adversary against an ABW-NM scheme
can send a plaintext of their choice to the receiver. Finally, our definition does
not demand secrecy; instead, we show that quantum secrecy is a consequence of
quantum non-malleability. This is a significant departure from the classical case,
and is analogous to the fact that quantum authentication implies secrecy [7].
The primary consequence of our work is twofold: first, encryption with uni-
tary two-designs satisfies all of the above notions of quantum non-malleability;
second, when equipped with blank “tag” qubits, the same scheme also satisfies
all of the above notions of quantum authentication. A more detailed summary
of the results is as follows. For schemes which have unitary encryption maps, we
prove that NM is equivalent to encryption with unitary two-designs, and hence
also to ABW-NM. For non-unitary schemes, we prove a characterization theorem
for NM schemes that shows that NM implies ABW-NM, and provide a strong
separation example between NM and ABW-NM (the aforementioned plaintext
injection attack). In the case of GYZ authentication, we prove that two-designs
(with tags) are sufficient, a significant improvement over the state-of-the-art,
which requires eight-designs [18]. Moreover, the simulation of adversaries in this
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proof is efficient, in the sense of Broadbent and Wainewright [11]. Finally, we
show that GYZauthentication implies DNS-authentication, and that equipping
an arbitrary NM scheme with tags yields DNS-authentication.
We remark that, after the initial version of our results was submitted, an inde-
pendent work of C. Portmann gave an alternative proof that GYZ-authentication
can be satisfied by the 2-design scheme [26].
1.1 Summary of contributions
In the following, all schemes are symmetric-key encryption schemes for quantum
data, in the information-theoretic security setting.
Quantum non-malleability. We begin with non-malleability, in both the per-
fect setting (Section 3) and the approximate setting (Section 4).
1. New definition of non-malleability. We give a new definition of quantum
non-malleability (NM), in terms of the information gain of an adversary’s
effective attack on the plaintext. The quantum registers are: plaintext A,
ciphertext C, user’s reference R, and adversary’s side information B.
Definition 1.1 (NM, informal) A scheme is non-malleable (NM) if for
any %ABR and any attack ΛCB→CB˜, the effective attack Λ˜AB→AB˜ satisfies
I(AR : B˜)Λ˜(%) ≤ I(AR : B)% + h(p=(Λ, %)).
The binary entropy term is necessary because adversaries can always simply
record whether they disturbed the ciphertext (see Definition 3.4).
2. Results on non-malleability. Our first result is an alternative character-
ization of NM, in terms of the form of the effective map Λ˜.
Theorem 1.2 (informal) A scheme is NM if and only if, for any attack
ΛCB→CB˜, there exist maps Λ
′
B→B˜, Λ
′′
B→B˜ such that the effective attack sat-
isfies
Λ˜ = idA ⊗ Λ′ + 1|C|2 − 1 (|C| 〈DK(1C)〉 − id)A ⊗ Λ
′′ .
The fact that NM implies ABW-NM is an immediate corollary. The new
definition is strictly stronger than ABW-NM: we give a scheme which is secure
under ABW-NM but insecure under NM. This scheme is in fact susceptible
to a powerful attack, whereby a simple adversary can replace the output of
decryption with a plaintext of the adversary’s choice. On the other hand, if
we restrict our attention to schemes where the encryption maps are unitary,
then we are able to show the following.
Theorem 1.3 (informal) Let Π be a scheme such that encryption Ek is
unitary for all keys k. Then Π is NM if and only if {Ek}k is a two-design.
By the results of [6], we conclude that NM and ABW-NM are in fact equiv-
alent for unitary schemes. Finally, we show that NM implies secrecy.
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Theorem 1.4 (informal) Quantum non-malleability implies secrecy.
3. Authentication from non-malleability. Our final result in the setting of
non-malleability shows that, by adding a “tag” space to the plaintext (as in
the Clifford scheme [2]), we can turn an NM scheme into an authentication
scheme as defined in [16]. More precisely, given an encryption scheme Π =
{Ek}, we define Πtagt to be a new scheme whose encryption is % 7→ Ek
(
%A⊗
|0〉〈0|⊗tB
)
E†k, and whose decryption rejects unless B measures to |0t〉.
Theorem 1.5 (informal) Let Π = {Ek} be an encryption scheme. If Π is
NM, then Πtagt is 2
2−t-DNS-authenticating.
Quantum authentication. Our results on quantum authentication are sum-
marized as follows. We note that, strictly speaking, our definitions of authen-
tication deviate slightly from the original versions [16, 18], in that decryption
outputs a reject symbol in place of the plaintext (rather than setting an auxiliary
bit to “reject.”) This adaptation is convenient for reasons we will return to later.
1. GYZ implies DNS. First, we show that GYZ-authentication implies DNS-
authentication. We remark that this is not trivial: on one hand, GYZ strength-
ens DNS by requiring high probability of success (rather than success on-
average); on the other hand, in the reject case GYZ requires nothing while
DNS makes rather stringent demands. Nonetheless, we show the following.
Theorem 1.6 (informal) Let Π be an encryption scheme. If Π is ε-GYZ-
authenticating, then it is also O(
√
ε)-DNS-authenticating.
2. GYZ is achievable with 2-designs. Next, we show that GYZ-authentica-
tionis achieved with a “tagged” two-design scheme. The analysis of [18] re-
quired eight-designs for the same construction.
Theorem 1.7 (informal) Let Π = {Ek}k be a 2−t-approximate 2-design
scheme. Then Πtagt is 2
−Ω(t)-GYZ-authenticating.
3. GYZ authentication from non-malleability. As a straightforward con-
sequence of Theorem 1.3 and Theorem 1.7, we finally record that tagging a
unitary non-malleable scheme results in a GYZ-authenticating scheme.
Corollary 1.8 (informal) There exists a constant r > 0 such that the fol-
lowing holds. If Π is a unitary Ω(2−rn)-NM scheme for n-qubit messages,
and t = poly(n), then Πtagt is 2
−Ω(poly(n))-GYZ-authenticating.
A sufficiently strong NM scheme can be constructed via the -approximate
version of Theorem 1.3 (see Theorem 4.5 and Remark 2.3 below.)
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we re-
view some basic facts regarding quantum states, registers, and channels, and
recall several useful facts about unitary designs. In Section 3, we consider the
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exact setting, beginning with perfect secrecy and then continuing to perfect non-
malleability (NM) and the relevant new results; we also discuss the relationship to
ABW-NM in detail. We continue in Section 4 with the approximate setting, again
beginning with secrecy and then continuing to approximate non-malleability. We
end with the new results on quantum authentication, in Section 4.2.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Quantum states, registers, and channels.
We assume basic familiarity with the formalism of quantum states, operators,
and channels. We denote quantum registers (i.e., systems and their subsystems)
with capital Latin letters, e.g., A,B,C. The Hilbert space corresponding to sys-
tem A is denoted by HA. For a register A, we denote the dimension of HA by |A|.
We emphasize that, in this work, all Hilbert spaces will be finite-dimensional.
The space operators on HA is denoted B(HA). We say that a quantum state
is classical if it is diagonal in the standard (i.e., computational) basis. We denote
the adjoint of an operator X ∈ B(H) by X† and its transpose with respect to
the computational basis by XT . Where necessary, we will write a quantum state
% ∈ B(HA ⊗ HB ⊗ HC) as %ABC to emphasize that the state is a multipartite
state over registers A, B, and C. When such a state has already been defined,
we will write reduced states by omitting the traced-out registers, e.g., %A :=
TrBC [%ABC ]. We single out some special states which will appear frequently. Fix
two systems S, S′ with |S| = |S′|. We let
|φ+〉SS′ = |S|−1/2
∑
i
|ii〉SS′ and φ+SS′ = |φ+〉〈φ+|SS′
denote the maximally entangled state on the bipartite system SS′ (expressed as
a pure state on the left, and as a density operator on the right.) Furthermore,
we let Π−SS′ = 1SS′ −φ+SS′ and τ−SS′ = Π−SS′/(|S|2− 1). We also set τS = 1S/|S|
to be the maximally mixed state on S.
We denote the von Neumann entropy of a state %A by H(A)%, and the joint
entropy of %AB by H(AB)%. We recall that the quantum mutual information of
%AB is defined by
I(A : B)% := H(A)% +H(B)% −H(AB)% .
The quantum conditional mutual information of %ABC is defined by
I(A : B|C)% := H(AC)% +H(BC)% −H(ABC)% −H(C)% .
These quantities are nonnegative [21] and satisfy a chain rule:
I(A : BC|D)% = I(A : B|D)% + I(A : C|BD)% .
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We remark that the above also holds for trivial D. Together with the Stinespring
dilation theorem [27], non-negativity [22] and the chain rule imply the data
processing inequality
I(A : B˜|C)Λ(%) ≤ I(A : B|C)% ,
when Λ is a CPTP (completely-positive, trace-preserving) map from B(HB) to
B(HB˜). An important special case is where B = B1B2 and Λ = TrB2 discards
the contents of B2.
We will refer to valid transformations between quantum states as channels, or
CPTP maps. We will sometimes also consider trace-non-increasing completely-
positive (CP) maps. When necessary, we will emphasize the input and output
spaces of a map Λ : B(HA ⊗HB)→ B(HC) by writing ΛAB→C . We denote the
identity channel on, e.g., register A by idA→A (or simply idA) and the channel
from register A to A′ with constant output σA′ by 〈σ〉A→A′ . When composing
operators on many registers, and if the context allows, we will elide tensor prod-
ucts with the identity operator. So, for example, with Λ as above we may write
τCD = Λ%ABD in place of τCD = (Λ⊗ idD)%ABD.
A standard tool in this setting is the Choi-Jamio lkowski (CJ) isomorphism
[12, 19]. Let ΞA→B : B(HA)→ B(HB) be a linear operator. Then its CJ matrix
is defined as
(ηΞ)BA′ = ΛA→B(φ
+
AA′). (2.1)
The linear operator mapping Ξ to ηΞ is an isomorphism of vector spaces and
ηΞ is positive semidefinite iff Ξ is CP. Moreover ΞA→B is TP iff (ηΞ)A′ = τA.
The inverse of the CJ isomorphism is given by the equation
ΞA→B(XA) = |A|TrA′
[
XTA′ (ηΞ)BA′
]
. (2.2)
We denote the swap operator by F : |i〉 ⊗ |j〉 7→ |j〉 ⊗ |i〉.
Lemma 2.1 (Swap trick [17]) For matrices A and B, Tr[AB] = Tr[FA⊗B].
We will make frequent use of the trace norm ‖ · ‖1, the operator norm ‖ · ‖∞,
and the diamond norm ‖ΛA→B‖ := max%AA′ ‖ΛA→B ⊗ idA′(%AA′)‖1; here the
max is taken over all pure quantum states %AA′ and HA ∼= HA′ . Recall that the
Ho¨lder inequality for operators states that, for any two operators X and Y ,
Tr[XY ] ≤ ‖XY ‖1 ≤ ‖X‖1‖Y ‖∞ . (2.3)
2.2 Unitary designs.
We now recall the definition of unitary t-design, and some relevant variants. We
begin by considering three different types of “twirls.”
1. For a finite subset D ⊂ U(H) of the unitary group on some finite dimensional
Hilbert space H, let
T (t)D (X) =
1
|D|
∑
U∈D
U⊗tX
(
U†
)⊗t
(2.4)
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be the associated t-twirling channel. If we take the entire unitary group
(rather than just a finite subset), then we get the Haar t-twirling channel
T (t)Haar(X) =
∫
U⊗tX
(
U†
)⊗t
dU. (2.5)
2. We define the U -U twirl with respect to finite D ⊂ U(H) by
T D(X) = 1|D|
∑
U∈D
(
U ⊗ U)X (U ⊗ U)† . (2.6)
The analogous U -U Haar twirling channel is denoted by T Haar.
3. The third notion is called a channel twirl, and is defined in terms of U -U -
twirling. Given a channel Λ, let ηΛ be the CJ state of Λ. The channel twirl
T chD (Λ) of Λ is defined to be the channel whose CJ state is T D(ηΛ).
Next, we define the three corresponding notions of designs.
Definition 2.2 Let D ⊂ U(H) be a finite set. We define the following.
– If
∥∥T (t)D − T (t)Haar∥∥ ≤ δ holds, then D is a δ-approximate t-design.
– If
∥∥T D − T Haar∥∥ ≤ δ holds, then D is a δ-approximate U -U -twirl design.
– If
∥∥T chD (Λ)− T chHaar(Λ)∥∥ ≤ δ holds for all CPTP maps Λ, then D is a δ-
approximate channel-twirl design.
For all three of the above, the case δ = 0 is called an “exact design” (or simply
“design”.) All three notions of design are equivalent in the exact case. In the
approximate case they are still connected, but there are some nontrivial costs
in the approximation quality (See [23], Lemma 2.2.14, and an additional easy
lemma proven in the full version [3]).
It is well-known that ε-approximate t-designs on n qubits can be generated
by random quantum circuits of size polynomial in n, t and log(1/ε) [10]. In
particular, the size of these circuits is polynomial even for exponentially-small
choices of ε. We emphasize this observation as follows.
Remark 2.3 Fix a polynomial t in n. Then, for any ε > 0, a random n-qubit
quantum circuit consisting of poly(n, log(1/ε)) gates (from a universal set) sat-
isfies every notion of -approximate t-design in Definition 2.2.
For exact designs, we point out two important constructions. First, the pro-
totypical example of a unitary one-design on n qubits is the n-qubit Pauli group.
For exact unitary two-designs, the standard example is the Clifford group, which
is the normalizer of the n-qubit Pauli group. Alternatively, the Clifford group
is generated by circuits from the gate set {H,P,CNOT}. It is well-known that
one can efficiently generate exact unitary two-designs on n-qubits by building
appropriate circuits from this gate set, using O(n2) random bits [1, 14].
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3 The zero-error setting
We begin with the zero-error. In the case of secrecy, zero-error means that
schemes cannot leak any information whatsoever. In the case of non-malleability,
zero-error means that the adversary cannot increase their correlations with the
secret by even an infinitesimal amount (except by trivial means; see below.)
3.1 Perfect secrecy
We begin with a definition of symmetric-key quantum encryption. Our formula-
tion treats rejection during decryption in a slightly different manner from pre-
vious literature.
Definition 3.1 (Encryption scheme) A symmetric-key quantum encryption
scheme (QES) is a triple (τK , E,D) consisting of a classical state τK ∈ B(HK)
and a pair of channels
E : B(HA ⊗HK) −→ B(HC ⊗HK)
D : B(HC ⊗HK) −→ B((HA ⊕ C|⊥〉)⊗HK)
satisfying [D ◦ E](· ⊗ |k〉〈k|) = (idA ⊕ 0⊥)⊗ |k〉〈k| for all k.
The Hilbert spacesHA,HC andHK are implicitly given by the triple (τK , E,D).
The state |⊥〉 is an error flag that allows the decryption map to report an error.
For notational convenience when dealing with these schemes, we set
Ek = E(· ⊗ |k〉〈k|) EK = TrKE(· ⊗ τK)
Dk = D(· ⊗ |k〉〈k|) DK = TrKD(· ⊗ τK) .
We will often slightly abuse notation by referring to decryption maps Dk as
maps from C to A; in fact, the output space of Dk is really the slightly larger
space A¯ := A⊕ C|⊥〉.
It is natural to define secrecy in the quantum world in terms of quantum
mutual information. However, instead of asking for the ciphertext to be uncor-
related with the plaintext as in the classical case, we ask for the ciphertext to
be uncorrelated from any reference system.
Definition 3.2 (Perfect secrecy) A QES (τK , E,D) satisfies information -
theoretic secrecy (ITS) if, for any Hilbert space HB and any %AB ∈ B(HA⊗HB),
setting σCBK = E(%AB ⊗ τK) implies I(C : B)σ = 0.
We note that, for perfect ITS, adding side information is unnecessary: the def-
inition already implies that the ciphertext is in product with any other system.
In particular, if the adversary has some auxiliary system E in their possession,
then I(B : CE)σ = I(B : E)σ. Several definitions of secrecy for symmetric-key
quantum encryption have appeared in the literature, but the above formulation
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appears to be new. It can be shown that ITS is equivalent to perfect indistin-
guishability of ciphertexts (IND). The latter notion is a special case of an early
indistinguishability-based definition of Ambainis et al. [5].
In many situations it makes sense to restrict ourselves to QES that have
identical plaintext and ciphertext spaces; due to correctness, this is equivalent
to unitarity.
Definition 3.3 (Unitary scheme) A QES (τK , E,D) is called unitary if the
encryption and decryption maps are controlled unitaries, i.e., if there exists V =∑
k U
(k)
A ⊗ |k〉〈k|K such that E(X) = V XV †.
It is straightforward to prove that, for unitary schemes, ITS is equivalent to the
statement that the encryption maps {Ek} form a unitary 1-design. Note that
unitarity of Ek and correctness imply unitarity of Dk.
3.2 A new notion of non-malleability
Definition. We consider a scenario involving a user Alice and an adversary
Mallory. The scenario begins with Mallory preparing a tripartite state %ABR
over three registers: the plaintext A, the reference R, and the side-information
B. The registers A and R are given to Alice, while Mallory keeps B. Alice then
encrypts A into a ciphertext C and then transmits (or stores) it in the open.
Mallory now applies an attack map
Λ : B(HC ⊗HB)→ B(HC ⊗HB˜) .
Mallory keeps the (transformed) side-information B˜ and returns C to Alice.
Finally, Alice decrypts C back to A, and the scenario ends. We are now interested
Fig. 1. The quantum non-malleability scenario.
in measuring the extent to which Mallory was able to increase her correlations
with Alice’s systems A and R. This can be understood by analyzing the mutual
information I(AR : B˜)Λ˜(%) where Λ˜AB→AB˜ is the effective channel corresponding
to Mallory’s attack:
Λ˜ = TrK(D ◦ Λ ◦ E)((·)⊗ τK) . (3.1)
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We point out one way in which Mallory can always increase these correlations,
regardless of the structure of the encryption scheme. First, she flips a coin b, and
records the outcome in B. If b = 1, she replaces the contents of C with some fixed
state σC , and otherwise she leaves C untouched. One then sees that Mallory’s
correlations have increased by h(p=(Λ, %)), where h denotes binary entropy and
p= is a defined as follows.
p=(Λ, %) = Tr
[
(φ+CC′ ⊗ 1B˜)Λ(φ+CC′ ⊗ %B)
]
. (3.2)
This quantity is the inner product between the identity map and the map Λ(( · )⊗
%B), expressed in terms of CJ states. Intuitively, it measures the probability with
which Mallory chooses to apply the identity map; taking the binary entropy then
gives us the information gain resulting from recording this choice.
We are now ready to define information-theoretic quantum non-malleability.
Stated informally, a scheme is non-malleable if Mallory can only implement the
attacks described above.
Definition 3.4 (Non-malleability) A QES (τK , E,D) is non-malleable (NM)
if for any state %ABR and any CPTP map ΛCB→CB˜, we have
I(AR : B˜)Λ˜(%) ≤ I(AR : B)% + h(p=(Λ, %)). (3.3)
One might justifiably wonder if the term h(p=(Λ, %)) is too generous to the
adversary. However, as we showed above, every scheme is vulnerable to an at-
tack which gains this amount of information. This term also appears (somewhat
disguised) in the classical setting. In fact, if a classical encryption scheme sat-
isfies Definition 3.4 against classical adversaries, then it also satisfies classical
information-theoretic non-malleability as defined in [20].
Definition 3.4 directly generalizes the classical information-theoretic defini-
tion from [20]. In some settings, it might be preferable to have a definition which
characterizes the set of effective attack channels as was done in [6]. As it turns
out, NM can be defined in this way.
Theorem 3.7 (Non-malleability, alternative form) A QES(τ, E,D) is NM
if and only if for any attack ΛCB→CB˜, the effective map Λ˜AB→AB˜ has the form
Λ˜ = idA ⊗ Λ′B→B˜ +
1
|C|2 − 1
(|C|2 〈DK(τ)〉 − id)A ⊗ Λ′′B→B˜ (3.4)
where Λ′ = TrCC′ [φ+CC′Λ(φ
+
CC′ ⊗ (·))] and Λ′′ = TrCC′ [Π−CC′Λ(φ+CC′ ⊗ (·))].
The proof of this theorem is postponed to the results section below (proof sketch)
and the appendix.
Finally, as we will show in later sections, Definition 3.4 implies ABW-NM (see
Definition 3.8), and schemes satisfying Definition 3.4 are sufficient for building
quantum authentication under the strongest known definitions.
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Non-malleability implies secrecy. In the classical case, non-malleability is
independent from secrecy: the one-time pad is secret but malleable, and non-
malleability is unaffected by appending the plaintext to each ciphertext. In the
quantum case, on the other hand, we can show that NM implies secrecy. This is
analogous to the fact that “quantum authentication implies encryption” [7].
Proposition 3.5 Let (τK , E,D) be an NM QES. Then (τK , E,D) is ITS.
Proof. Let B, %AB , and σCBK = E(%AB⊗τK) be as in the definition of ITS (Def-
inition 3.2). We first rename B to R. We then consider the non-malleability prop-
erty in the following special-case scenario. The initial side-information register
is empty, the final side-information register B˜ satisfies HB˜ ∼= HC , and the ad-
versary map ΛC→CB˜ is defined as follows. Note that the “ciphertext-extraction”
map ΘC→CB˜ = idC→B˜(·) ⊗ τC has CJ state ηΘCC′B˜ = φ
+
C′B˜
⊗ τC . We choose Λ
so that its CJ state satisfies
ηΛ
CC′B˜ =
d2
d2 − 1Π
−
CC′ η
Θ
CC′B˜ Π
−
CC′ . (3.5)
Applying the above projection to the CJ state of Θ ensures that Λ will have
p=(Λ) = 0 (note: p=(Θ) > 0.)
Direct calculation of the C ′B˜ marginal of the CJ state of Λ yields
ηΛ
C′B˜ =
d2 − 2
d2 − 1φ
+
C′B˜
+
1
d2 − 1τC′ ⊗ τB˜ . (3.6)
This implies that the output σARB˜ = Λ˜A→AB˜(%AB) of the effective channel Λ˜
will satisfy
σB˜R =
d2 − 2
d2 − 1γB˜R +
1
d2 − 1τB˜ ⊗ %R, (3.7)
where γCR = (EK)A→C(%AR) and we used the fact that HB˜ ∼= HC . By non-
malleability, we have
I(B˜ : R)σ + I(B˜ : A|R)σ = I(B˜ : AR)σ = 0. (3.8)
In particular, I(B˜ : R)σ = 0 and thus σB˜R = σB˜ ⊗ %R. It follows by Equation
(3.7) that
γB˜R =
d2 − 1
d2 − 2
(
σB˜ −
1
d2 − 1τB˜
)
⊗ %R, (3.9)
i.e., γB˜R is a product state. This is precisely the definition of information-
theoretic secrecy. uunionsq
Characterization of non-malleable schemes. Next, we provide a charac-
terization of non-malleable schemes. First, we show that unitary schemes are
equivalent to encryption with a unitary 2-design.
Theorem 3.6 A unitary QES (τK , E,D) is NM if and only if {Ek}k∈K is a
unitary 2-design.
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This fact is particularly intuitive when the 2-design is the Clifford group, a well-
known exact 2-design. In that case, a Pauli operator acting on only one ciphertext
qubit will be “propagated” (by the encryption circuit) to a completely random
Pauli on all plaintext qubits. The plaintext is then maximally mixed, and the
adversary gains no information. The Clifford group thus yields a perfectly non-
malleable (and perfectly secret) encryption scheme using O(n2) bits of key [1].
It will be convenient to prove Theorem 3.6 as a consequence of our general
characterization theorem, which is as follows.
Theorem 3.7 Let (τ, E,D) be a QES. Then (τ, E,D) is NM if and only if, for
any attack ΛCB→CB˜, the effective map Λ˜AB→AB˜ has the form
Λ˜ = idA ⊗ Λ′B→B˜ +
1
|C|2 − 1
(|C|2 〈DK(τ)〉 − id)A ⊗ Λ′′B→B˜ (3.10)
where Λ′ = TrCC′ [φ+CC′Λ(φ
+
CC′ ⊗ (·))] and Λ′′ = TrCC′ [Π−CC′Λ(φ+CC′ ⊗ (·))].
We remark that the forward direction holds even if (τ, E,D) only fulfills the
NM condition (Equation (3.3)) against adversaries with empty side-information
B. The proof of Theorem 3.7 (with this strengthening) is sketched below. The
full proof is somewhat technical and can be found in Appendix B. More precisely,
we prove the stronger Theorem B.3, which implies the above by setting ε = 0.
Proof sketch. The first implication, i.e. NM implies Equation (3.10), is best
proven in the Choi-Jamoi lkowski picture. Here, any QES defines a map
ECC′→AA′ = 1|K|
∑
k
Dk ⊗ ETk , (3.11)
where the transpose ETk is the map whose Kraus operators are the transposes
of the Kraus operators of Ek (in the standard basis). Our goal is to prove that
this map essentially acts like the UU¯ -twirl. We decompose the space H⊗2C as
H⊗2C = C|φ+〉 ⊕ suppΠ− (3.12)
which induces a decomposition of
B(H⊗2C ) = C|φ+〉〈φ+| ⊕
{∣∣φ+〉〈v| ∣∣∣ 〈φ+ | v〉 = 0}
⊕
{
|v〉〈φ+∣∣ ∣∣∣ 〈φ+ | v〉 = 0}⊕ {X ∈ B∣∣∣〈φ+|X = X|φ+〉 = 0} . (3.13)
On the first and last direct summands, the correct behavior of E is easy to show:
the first one corresponds to the identity, and the last one to the non-identity
channels Λ with p=(Λ) = 0. For the remaining two spaces, we employ Lemma A.3
which shows that the encryption map of any valid encryption scheme has the
form of appending an ancillary mixed state and then applying an isometry.
Evaluating E(|φ+〉〈v|) for 〈φ+ | v〉 = 0 reduces to evaluating the adjoint of the
average encryption map, E†K , on traceless matrices. It is, however, easy to verify
that
TrAECC′→AA′(σC ⊗ (·)C′) = (ETK)C′→A′
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for any σC . This can be used to prove EK = 〈τC〉 by observing that 〈φ+|CC′σC⊗
%C′ |φ+〉CC′ = Tr(σC%C), so for rank-deficient % we can calculate ECC′→AA′(σC⊗
(·)C′) using what we have already proven.
The other direction is proven by a simple application of Lemma A.2. uunionsq
The fact that NM is equivalent to 2-designs (for unitary schemes) is a straight-
forward consequence of the above.
Proof. (of Theorem 3.6) First, assume (τK , E,D) is a unitary NM QES with
Ek = Uk(·)U†k . Then it has |C| = |A|, and DK(τC) = τA, so the conclusion of
Theorem 3.7 in this case (i.e., Equation (3.10)) is exactly the condition for {Uk}
to be an exact channel twirl design and therefore an exact 2-design. If (τK , E,D),
on the other hand, is a unitary QES and {Uk} is a 2-design, then Equation (3.10)
holds and the scheme is therefore NM according to Theorem 3.7.
Relationship to ABW non-malleability. Ambainis, Bouda and Winter give
a different definition of non-malleability, expressed in terms of the effective maps
that an adversary can apply to the plaintext by acting on the ciphertext produced
from encrypting with a random key [6]. According to their definition, a scheme is
non-malleable if the adversary can only apply maps from a very restricted class
when averaging over the key, and without giving side information to the active
adversary. Let us recall their definition here.
First, given a QES (τK , E,D), we define the set S := {DK(σC) |σC ∈ B(HC)}
consisting of all valid average decryptions. We then define the class CSA of all
“replacement channels”. This is the set of CPTP maps belonging to the space
spanR{idA, (X 7→ Tr(X)σA) : σA ∈ S} . (3.14)
We then make the following definition, which first appeared in [6].
Definition 3.8 (ABW non-malleability) A QES (τK , E,D) is ABW-non-
malleable (ABW-NM) if it is ITS, and for all channels ΛC→C , we have
TrK [DCK→AK ◦ ΛC→C ◦ EAK→CK( · ⊗ τK)] ∈ CSA. (3.15)
As indicated in [6], an approximate version of Equation (3.15) is obtained
by considering the diamond-norm distance between the effective channel and
the set CSA; this implies the possibility of an auxiliary reference system, which
is denoted R in NM. We emphasize that this reference system is not under the
control of the adversary. In particular, ABW-NM does not allow for adversaries
which maintain and actively use side information about the plaintext system.
Another notable distinction is that [6] includes a secrecy assumption in the
definition of an encryption scheme; under this assumption, it is shown that a
unitary QES is ABW-NM if and only if the encryption unitaries form a 2-design.
By our Theorem 3.6, we see that NM and ABW-NM are equivalent in the case
of unitary schemes. So, in that case, ABW-NM actually ensures a much stronger
security notion than originally considered by the authors of [6].
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In the general case, NM is strictly stronger than ABW-NM. First, by com-
paring the conditions of Definition 3.8 to Equation (3.10), we immediately get
the following corollary of Theorem 3.7.
Corollary 3.9 If a QES satisfies NM, then it also satisfies ABW-NM.
Second, we give a separation example which shows that ABW-NM is highly
insecure; in fact, it allows the adversary to “inject” a plaintext of their choice into
the ciphertext. This is insecure even under the classical definition of information-
theoretic non-malleability of [20]. We now describe the scheme and this attack.
Example 3.10 Suppose (τK , E,D) is a QES that is both NM and ABW-NM.
Define a modified scheme (τK , E
′, D′), with enlarged ciphertext space HC′ =
HC ⊕HAˆ (where HAˆ ∼= HA) and encryption and decryption defined by
E′(X) = E(X)C ⊕ 0Aˆ
D′(X) = DCK→AK(ΠCXΠC) + idAˆK→AK(ΠAˆXΠAˆ) .
Then (τK , E
′, D′) is ABW-NM but not NM.
While encryption ignores HAˆ, decryption measures if we are in C or Aˆ and then
decrypts (in the first case) or just outputs the contents (in the second case.) This
is a dramatic violation of NM: set HB˜ ∼= HA, trivial B and R, and
ΛC′→C′B˜(X) = Tr(X)0C ⊕ |φ+〉〈φ+|AˆB˜ ; (3.16)
it follows that, for all %,
I(AR : B˜)Λ˜(%) = 2 log |A|  h(|C ′|−2) = h(p=(Λ, %)) . (3.17)
Now let us show that (τ, E′, D′) is still ABW-NM. Let ΛC′→C′ be an attack,
i.e., an arbitrary CPTP map. Then the effective plaintext map is
Λ˜A→A = D ◦ ΛCC→C ◦ E + ΛAˆC→A ◦ E, (3.18)
where ΛC(XC) = ΠCΛ(XC⊕0Aˆ)ΠC and ΛAˆ(XC) = idAˆ→A(ΠAˆΛ(XC⊕0Aˆ)ΠAˆ).
Since (τ, E,D) is ITS (Theorem 3.5), there exists a fixed state %0C such that
EK(%A) = %
0
C for all %A. Since (τ, E,D) is ABW-NM, we also know that
TrK ◦D ◦ ΛCC→C ◦ E = Λ˜1 ∈ CSA ,
with S = {DK(σC) |σC ∈ B(HC)}. We therefore get
Λ˜A→A = Λ˜1 + 〈ΛAˆ(%0C)〉 ∈ CS
′
A , (3.19)
with S′ = {D′K(σC′) |σC′ ∈ B(HC′)}. This is true because S′ contains all con-
stant maps, as D′K(0C ⊕ %Aˆ) = %A.
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4 The approximate setting
We now consider the case of approximate non-malleability. Approximate schemes
are relevant for several reasons. First, an approximate scheme with negligible
error can be more efficient than an exact one: the most efficient construction of an
exact 2-design requires a quantum circuit of O(n log n log log n) gates [13], where
approximate 2-designs can be achieved with linear-length circuits [14]. Second,
in practice, absolutely perfect implementation of all quantum gates is too much
to expect—even with error-correction. Third, when passing to authentication
one must allow for errors, as it is always possible for the adversary to escape
detection (with low probability) by guessing the secret key.
For all these reasons, it is important to understand what happens when the
perfect secrecy and perfect non-malleability requirements are slightly relaxed.
In this section, we show that our definitions and results are stable under such
relaxations, and prove several additional results for quantum authentication. We
begin with the approximate-case analogue of perfect secrecy.
Definition 4.1 (Approximate secrecy) Fix ε > 0. A QES (τK , E,D) is ε-
approximately secret (-ITS) if, for any HB and any %AB, setting σCBK =
E(%AB ⊗ τK) implies I(C : B)σ ≤ ε.
Analogously to the exact case, unitary schemes satisfying approximate se-
crecy are equivalent to approximate one-designs (see the full version of this
article [3]).
4.1 Approximate non-malleability
Definition. We now define a natural approximate-case analogue of NM, i.e.,
Definition 3.4. Let us briefly recall the context. The malleability scenario is
described by systems A, C, B and R (respectively, plaintext, ciphertext, side-
information, and reference), an initial tripartite state %ABR, and an attack chan-
nel ΛCB→CB˜ . Given this data, we have the effective channel Λ˜AB→AB˜ defined
in Equation (3.1) and the “unavoidable attack” probability p=(Λ, %) defined in
Equation (3.2). The new definition now simply relaxes the requirement on the
increase of the adversary’s mutual information.
Definition 4.2 (Approximate non-malleability) A QES (τK , E,D) is ε-
non-malleable (ε-NM) if for any state %ABR and any CPTP map ΛCB→CB˜,
we have
I(AR : B˜)Λ˜(%) ≤ I(AR : B)% + h(p=(Λ, %)) + ε. (4.1)
We record the approximate version of Proposition 3.5, i.e., non-malleability
implies secrecy. The proof is a straightforward adaptation of the exact case.
Proposition 4.3 Let (τK , E,D) be an ε-NM QES. Then (τK , E,D) is 2ε-ITS.
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Non-malleability with approximate designs. Continuing as before, we now
generalize the characterization theorems of non-malleability (Theorem 3.7 and
Theorem 3.6) to the approximate case.
Theorem 4.4 Let (τ, E,D) be a QES with ciphertext dimension |C| = 2m and
r > 0 a sufficiently large constant. Then the following holds:
1. If (τ, E,D) is 2−rm-NM, then for any attack ΛCB→CB˜, the effective map
Λ˜AB→AB˜ is 2
−Ω(m)-close (in diamond norm) to
Λ˜exact
AB→AB˜ = idA ⊗ Λ′B→B˜ +
1
|C|2 − 1
(|C|2 〈DK(τ)〉 − id)A ⊗ Λ′′B→B˜ ,
with Λ′, Λ′′ as in Theorem 3.7.
2. Suppose that log |R| = O(2m), where R is the reference register in Defini-
tion 4.2. Then there exists a constant r, such that if every attack ΛCB→CB˜
results in an effective map that is 2−rm-close to Λ˜exact, then the scheme is
2−Ω(m)-NM.
This theorem is proven with explicit constants in Appendix B as Theorem B.3.
The condition on R required for the second implication is necessary, as the
relevant mutual information can at worst grow proportional to the logarithm
of the dimension according to the Alicki-Fannes inequality. This is not a very
strong requirement, as it should be relatively easy for the honest parties to put
a bound on their total memory.
Next, we record the corollary which states that, for unitary schemes, approxi-
mate non-malleability is equivalent to encryption with an approximate 2-design.
The proof proceeds as in the exact case, now starting from Theorem 4.4.
Theorem 4.5 Let Π = (τK , E,D) be a unitary QES for n-qubit messages and
f : N→ N a function that grows at most exponential. Then there exists a constant
r > 0 such that
1. If {Ek} is a Ω(2−rn)-approximate 2-design and log |R| ≤ f(n), then Π is
2−Ω(n)-NM.
2. If Π is Ω(2−rn)-NM, then {Ek}k∈K is a 2−Ω(n)-approximate 2-design.
Relationship to approximate ABW. Recall that, in Section 3.2, we dis-
cussed the relationship between our notion of exact non-malleability and that of
Ambainis et al. [6] (i.e., ABW-NM.) As we now briefly outline, our conclusions
carry over to the approximate case without any significant changes.
As described in Equation (3”) of [6], one first relaxes the notion of ABW-
NM appropriately by requiring that the containment (3.15) in Definition 3.8
holds up to ε error in the diamond-norm distance. In the unitary case, both def-
initions are equivalent to approximate 2-designs (by the results of [6], and our
Theorem 4.5). In the case of general schemes, the plaintext injection attack de-
scribed in Example 3.10 again shows that approximate ABW-NM is insufficient,
and that approximate NM is strictly stronger.
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4.2 Authentication
Definitions. Our definitions of authentication will be faithful to the original
versions in [16, 18], with one slight modification. When decryption rejects, our
encryption schemes (Definition 3.1) output ⊥ in the plaintext space, rather than
setting an auxiliary qubit to a “reject” state. These definitions are equivalent in
the sense that one can always set an extra qubit to “reject” conditioned on the
plaintext being ⊥ (or vice-versa). Nonetheless, as we will see below, this mild
change has some interesting consequences.
We begin with the definition of Dupuis, Nielsen and Salvail [16], which de-
mands that the effective average channel of the attacker ignores the plaintext.
Definition 4.6 (DNS Authentication [16]) A QES (τK , E,D) is called ε-
DNS-authenticating if, for any CPTP-map ΛCB→CB′ , there exists CP-maps
Λacc
B→B˜ and Λ
rej
B→B˜ such that Λ
acc + Λrej is 1 TP, and for all %AB we have∥∥TrKD(Λ(E(%AB ⊗ τK)))− (Λacc(%AB) + |⊥〉〈⊥| ⊗ Λrej(%B))∥∥1 ≤ ε . (4.2)
An alternative definition was recently given by Garg, Yuen and Zhandry [18].
It asks that, conditioned on acceptance, with high probability the effective chan-
nel is close to a channel which ignores the plaintext.
Definition 4.7 (GYZ Authentication [18]) A QES (τK , E,D) is called ε-
GYZ-authenticating if, for any CPTP-map ΛCB→CB′ , there exists a CP-map
Λacc
B→B˜ such that for all %AB∥∥ΠaccD(Λ(E(%AB ⊗ τK)))Πacc − Λacc(%AB)⊗ τK∥∥1 ≤ ε . (4.3)
Here Πacc is the acceptance projector, i.e. projection onto HA in HA ⊕ C|⊥〉.
A peculiar aspect of the original definition in [18] is that it does not specify the
outcome in case of rejection, and is thus stated in terms of trace non-increasing
maps. Of course, all realistic quantum maps must be CPTP; this means that the
designer of the encryption scheme must still declare what to do with the contents
of the plaintext register after decryption. Our notion of decryption makes one
such choice (i.e., output ⊥) which seems natural.
GYZ authentication implies DNS authentication. A priori, the relation-
ship between Definition 2.2 in [16] and Definition 8 in [18] is not completely
clear. On one hand, the latter is stronger in the sense that it requires success
with high probability (rather than simply on average.) On the other hand, the
former makes the additional demand that the ciphertext is untouched even if we
reject. As we now show, GYZ-authentication in fact implies DNS-authentication.
1 Note that there is a typographic error in [16] and [11] at this point of the definition.
In those papers, the two effective maps are asked to sum to the identity (instead of
just a TP map), which is impossible for many obvious choices of Λ.
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Theorem 4.8 Let (τ, E,D) be ε-totally authenticating for sufficiently small ε.
Then it is O(
√
ε)-DNS authenticating.
Proof. Let ΛCB→CB˜ be a CPTP map and ε ≤ 62−2. By Definition 4.7 there
exists a CP map Λ′
B→B˜ such that for all states %AB ,
‖ΠaD(Λ(E(%AB ⊗ τK)))Πa − Λ′(%AB ⊗ τK)))‖1 ≤ ε . (4.4)
Assume for simplicity that D = M⊥ ◦ D, where M⊥ measures the rejection
symbol versus the rest. (otherwise we can define a new decryption map that
way.) Define the CP maps
Λ
(1)
AB→B˜ = TrAΠaΛ˜(·) Λ
(2)
AB→B˜ = 〈⊥|AΛ˜(·)|⊥〉A
Λ′′
B→B˜ = TrCΛ(EK(τA)⊗ (·)).
By Theorem 15 in [18] we have
|EK(%ABR)− EK(τA)⊗ %BR‖1 ≤ 14
√
ε, (4.5)
which implies that
‖TrA ⊗ Λ′′ − TrC ◦ Λ ◦ EK‖ ≤ εˆ := 14
√
ε. (4.6)
Note that
TrC ◦Λ◦EK = TrCK ◦Λ◦E((·)⊗ τK)
= TrAK ◦D◦Λ◦E((·)⊗ τK) = TrA◦Λ˜. (4.7)
On the other hand, we also have that, by Equation (4.4),∥∥TrA ◦ Λ˜− TrA ⊗ Λ′ − Λ(2)∥∥ ≤ ∥∥TrA (ΠaΛ˜(·))− Λ′∥∥ ≤ ε (4.8)
Combining Equations (4.6), (4.7) and (4.8), we get∥∥Λ(2) − TrA ⊗ (Λ′′ − Λ′)∥∥ ≤ ε+ εˆ. (4.9)
Now observe that
[TrA ⊗ (Λ′ − Λ′′)B→B˜ ] ◦ΞA→A = TrA ⊗ (Λ′ − Λ′′)B→B˜ (4.10)
For all CPTP maps ΞA→A. We define Λ′′′B→B˜ = Λ
(2)(τA ⊗ (·)) and calculate∥∥Λ(2) − TrA ⊗ Λ′′′∥∥ ≤ ∥∥Λ(2) − TrA ⊗ (Λ′′ − Λ′)∥∥
+
∥∥TrA ⊗ (Λ′′ − Λ′)− TrA ⊗ Λ′′′∥∥ ,
by the triangle inequality for the diamond norm. Continuing with the calculation,∥∥Λ(2) − TrA ⊗ Λ′′′∥∥ ≤ ε+ εˆ+ ∥∥TrA ⊗ (Λ′′ − Λ′)− TrA ⊗ Λ′′′∥∥
= ε+ εˆ+
∥∥[TrA ⊗ (Λ′′ − Λ′)− Λ(2)] ◦ 〈τA〉A→A∥∥
≤ 2(ε+ εˆ) = 28√ε+ 2ε. (4.11)
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The first inequality above is Equation (4.9). The first equality is just a rewriting
of the definition of Λ′′′, and the second equality is Equation (4.10). Finally, the
last inequality is due to Equation (4.9) and the fact that the diamond norm is
submultiplicative.
We have almost proven security according to Definition 4.6, as we have shown
Λ˜ to be close in diamond norm to idA ⊗Λ′ +
〈|⊥〉〈⊥|〉⊗Λ′′′. However, Λ′ +Λ′′′
is only approximately TP; more precisely, we have that for all %ABR,
|Tr(Λ′ + Λ′′′)(%ABR)− 1| ≤ 28
√
ε+ 3ε (4.12)
by the triangle inequality. We therefore have to modify Λ′+Λ′′ so that it becomes
TP, while keeping the structure required for DNS authentication. Let MB =
(Λ′ + Λ′′′)†(1B˜). (4.12). Defining the CP-map M(X) = M−1/2XM−1/2 and
noting it is well-behaved for small ε, it follows from a straightforward calculation
(see the full version [3] of this article for details) that∣∣∣Λ˜AB→AB˜ − idA ⊗ ΛaccB→B˜ −⊥⊗ ΛrejB→B˜∥∥∥ ≤ O(√ε). (4.13)
with λacc = Λ′ ◦M and Λrej = Λ′′ ◦M.
uunionsq
Achieving GYZ authentication with two-designs. In [18], the authors pro-
vide a scheme for their notion of authentication based on unitary eight-designs.
We now show that, in fact, an approximate 2-design suffices. This implies that
the well-known Clifford scheme (see e.g [15, 11]) satisfies the strong security of
Definition 4.7. We remark that our proof is inspired by the reasoning based on
Schur’s lemma used in results on decoupling [8, 17, 24, 9].
Theorem 4.9 Let D = {Uk}k be a δ-approximate unitary 2-design on HC . Let
HC = HA ⊗HT and define
Ek(XA) = Uk (XA ⊗ |0〉〈0|T ) (Uk)†
Dk(YC) = 〈0|T (Uk)† Y Uk|0〉T + Tr((1T − |0〉〈0|T ) (Uk)† Y Uk)|⊥〉〈⊥| .
Then the QES (τK , E,D) is 4(1/|T |+ 3δ)1/3-GYZ-authenticating.
Remark 4.10 The following proof uses the same simulator as the proof for the
8-design scheme in [18], called ”oblivious adversary” there. The construction
exhibited there is efficient given that the real adversary is efficient.
Proof. To improve readability, we will occasionally switch between adding sub-
scripts to operators (indicating which spaces they act on) and omitting these
subscripts. We begin by remarking that it is sufficient to prove the GYZ con-
dition (specifically, Equation 4.3) for pure input states and isometric adversary
channels. Indeed, for a general state %AB and a general map ΛCB→CB˜ , we may
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let %ABR and VCB→CB˜E be the purification and Stinespring dilation, respec-
tively. We then simply observe that the trace distance decreases under partial
trace (see e.g. [25]). Let %AB be a pure input state and
ΛCB→CB˜(XCB) = VCB→CB˜XCBV
†
CB→CB˜
an isometry. We define the corresponding “ideal” channel ΓV , and the corre-
sponding “real, accept” channel Φk, as follows:
(ΓV )B→B˜ =
1
|C|TrCV and
(Φk)AB→AB˜ = 〈0|T (Uk)†CVCB→CB˜Uk|0〉T . (4.14)
Note that for any matrix M with ‖M‖∞ ≤ 1, the map ΛM (X) = M†XM is
completely positive and trace non-increasing. We have
‖ΓV ‖∞ ≤
1
|C|
∑
i
‖〈i|V |i〉‖∞ ≤ 1. (4.15)
We start by bounding the expectation of ‖((ΓV )B→B˜ − (Φk)AB→AB˜)|%〉AB‖22,
as follows. To simplify notation, we set σABT := |%〉〈%|AB ⊗ |0〉〈0|T to be the
tagged state corresponding to plaintext (and side information) %AB .
1
|K|
∑
k
‖(ΓV − Φk)|%〉‖22 =
1
|K|
∑
k
〈%|(ΓV − Φk)†(ΓV − Φk)|%〉
=
1
|K|
∑
k
Tr
[
σABT (Uk)
†V †Uk|0〉〈0|(Uk)†V Uk
]
− 2 1|K|
∑
k
Tr
[
σABT (Uk)
†V †UkΓV
]
+ 〈%| (ΓV )† ΓV |%〉 . (4.16)
First we bound the second term, using the fact that ΓV only acts on B.
1
|K|
∑
k
Tr
[
σABT (Uk)
†V †UkΓV
]
=
1
|K|
∑
k
Tr
[
UkσABT (Uk)
†V †ΓV
]
=
∫
Tr
[(
UσABTU
† +∆
)
V †ΓV
] ≥ ∫ Tr [UσABTU†V †ΓV ]− δ
=
∫
Tr
[
σABTU
†V †UΓV
]− δ = 〈%| (ΓV )† ΓV |%〉 − δ . (4.17)
In the above, the operator ∆ is the “error” operator in the δ-approximate 2-
design. The second equality above follows from ‖∆‖1 ≤ δ and the fact that a
2-design is also a 1-design; the inequality follows by Ho¨lder’s inequality, and the
last step follows from Schur’s lemma.
The first term of the RHS of Equation (4.16) can be simplified as follows. We
will begin by applying the swap trick (Lemma 2.1) Tr[XY ] = Tr[FX⊗Y ] in the
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second line below. The swap trick is applied to register CC ′, with the operators
X and Y defined as indicated below.
1
|K|
∑
k
Tr
[
σABT (Uk)
†
CV
†
CB˜→CB(Uk)C |0〉〈0|T︸ ︷︷ ︸
X
(Uk)
†
CVCB→CB˜(Uk)C︸ ︷︷ ︸
Y
]
=
1
|K|
∑
k
Tr
[
(σABT ⊗ |0〉〈0|T ′)
(
U⊗2k
)
CC′ V
†
CB˜→CBVC′B→C′B˜
(
U⊗2k
)†
CC′ FCC′
]
=
1
|K|
∑
k
Tr
[(
U⊗2k
)†
CC′ (σABT ⊗ |0〉〈0|T ′)
(
U⊗2k
)
CC′ V
†
CB˜→CBVC′B→C′B˜FCC′
]
≤
∫
Tr
[(
U⊗2
)†
CC′ (σABT ⊗ |0〉〈0|T ′)U⊗2CC′V
†
CB˜→CBVC′B→C′B˜FCC′
]
+ δ
=
∫
Tr
[
(σABT ⊗ |0〉〈0|T ′)U⊗2CC′V †CB˜→CBVC′B→C′B˜
(
U⊗2
)†
CC′ FCC′
]
+ δ.
(4.18)
The inequality above follows the same way as in Equation 4.17. Let d = |C|.
An easy representation-theoretic calculation (see the Full version [3] for details)
shows that∫
U⊗2V †
CB˜→CBVC′B→C′B˜
(
U⊗2
)†
dU = 1CC′ ⊗R1B + FCC′ ⊗RFB , (4.19)
where we have set
R1B =
1
d(d2 − 1)
(
d3Γ †V ΓV − d1
)
=
1
(d2 − 1)
(
d2Γ †V ΓV − 1
)
RFB =
1
d(d2 − 1)
(
d21− d2Γ †V ΓV
)
=
d
(d2 − 1)
(
1− Γ †V ΓV
)
.
plugging (4.19) into (4.18) and using Lemma 2.1 again, we get∫
Tr
[
(σABT ⊗ |0〉〈0|T ′)U⊗2CC′V †CB˜→CBVC′B→C′B˜
(
U⊗2
)†
CC′ FCC′
]
= Tr
[
(σABT ⊗ |0〉〈0|T ′)
(
1CC′ ⊗R1B2→B˜2 + FCC′ ⊗RFB2→B˜2
)
FCC′
]
= Tr
[|%〉〈%|B (R1B + |A|RFB)]
= Tr
[
|%〉〈%|B
(
d(d− |A|)
d2 − 1
(
Γ †V ΓV
)
B
+
d|A| − 1
d2 − 1 1B
)]
. (4.20)
Now recall that d = |A||T |. Using the fact that (a− 1)/(b− 1) ≤ a/b for b ≥ a,
we can give a bound as follows.
Tr
[
|%〉〈%|
(
d(d− |A|)
d2 − 1
(
Γ †V ΓV
)
+
d|A| − 1
d2 − 1 1
)]
=
d|A|(|T | − 1)
d2 − 1 〈%|
(
Γ †V ΓV
)
|%〉+ d|A| − 1
d2 − 1
≤ 〈%|
(
Γ †V ΓV
)
|%〉+ 1|T | . (4.21)
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Putting everything together, we arrive at
1
|K|
∑
k
‖(ΓV − Φk)|%〉‖22 ≤
1
|T | + 3δ. (4.22)
By Markov’s inequality this implies
P
[∥∥(ΓV − Φk)|%〉∥∥22 > α( 1|T | + 3δ
)]
≤ 1
α
(4.23)
which is equivalent to
P
[∥∥(ΓV − Φk)|%〉∥∥2 > α1/2( 1|T | + 3δ
)1/2]
≤ 1
α
, (4.24)
where the probability is taken over the uniform distribution on D. Choosing
α = (1/|T |+ 3δ)−1/3 this yields
P
[
‖(ΓV − Φk)|%〉‖2 >
(
1
|T | + 3δ
)1/3]
≤
(
1
|T | + 3δ
)1/3
. (4.25)
Let S ⊂ D be such that |S|/|D| ≥ 1− (1/|T |+ 3δ)1/3 and ‖(ΓV − Φk)|%〉‖2 ≤
(1/|T | + 3δ)1/3 for all Uk ∈ S. Using the easy-to-verify inequality ‖|ψ〉〈ψ| −
|φ〉〈φ|‖1 ≤ 2‖|ψ〉 − |φ〉‖2, we can bound
1
|K|
∑
Uk∈D
∥∥∥Φk|%〉〈%| (Φk)† − ΓV |%〉〈%|Γ †V ∥∥∥
1
≤ 1|S|
∑
Uk∈S
∥∥∥Φk|%〉〈%| (Φk)† − ΓV |%〉〈%|Γ †V ∥∥∥
1
+ 2
(
1
|T | + 3δ
)1/3
≤ 2|S|
∑
Uk∈S
‖(ΓV − Φk)|%〉‖2 + 2|T |−1/3
≤ 4
(
1
|T | + 3δ
)1/3
. (4.26)
This completes the proof for pure states and isometric adversary channels. As
noted above, the general case follows. uunionsq
As an example, one may set |T | = 2s (i.e. s tag qubits) and take an ap-
proximate unitary 2-design of accuracy 2−s. The resulting scheme would then
be Ω(2−s/3)-GYZ-authenticating.
A straightforward corollary of the above result is that, in the case of unitary
schemes, adding tags to non-malleable schemes results in GYZ authentication.
We leave open the question of whether this is the case for general (not necessarily
unitary) schemes.
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Corollary 4.11 Let (τ, E,D) be a 2−rn-non-malleable unitary QES with plain-
text space A. Define a new scheme (τ, E′, D′) with plaintext space A′ where
A = TA′ and
E′(X) = E(X ⊗ |0〉〈0|T )
D′(Y ) = 〈0|TD(Y )|0〉T + Tr [(1T − |0〉〈0|T )D(Y )] |⊥〉〈⊥| .
Then there is a constant r > 0 such that (τ, E′, D′) is 2−Ω(n)-GYZ-authenticating
if |T | = 2Ω(n).
The proof is a direct application of Theorem 4.5 (approximate non-malleability
is equivalent to approximate 2-design) and Theorem 4.9 (approximate 2-designs
suffice for GYZ authentication.) We emphasize that, by Remark 2.3, exponential
accuracy requirements can be met with polynomial-size circuits.
DNS authentication from non-malleability. We end with a theorem con-
cerning the case of general (i.e., not necessarily unitary) schemes. We show that
adding tags to a non-malleable scheme results in a DNS-authenticating scheme.
In this proof we will denote the output system of the decryption map by A to
emphasize that it is A enlarged by the reject symbol.
Theorem 4.12 Let r be a sufficiently large constant, and let (τ, E,D) be an
2−rn-NM QES with n qubit plaintext space A, and choose an integer d dividing
|A|. Then there exists a decomposition A = TA′ and a state |ψ〉T such that
|T | = d and the scheme (τ, E′, D′) defined by
Et(X) = E(X ⊗ |ψ〉〈ψ|T )
Dt(Y ) = 〈ψ|TD(Y )|ψ〉T + Tr [(1T − |ψ〉〈ψ|T )D(Y )] |⊥〉〈⊥| .
is (4/|T |) + 2−Ω(n)-DNS-authenticating.
Proof. We prove the statement for ε = 0 for simplicity, the general case follows
easily by employing Theorem 4.4 instead of Theorem 3.7.
By Theorem 3.7, for any attack map ΛCB→CB˜ , the effective map is equal to
Λ˜AB→AB˜ = idA ⊗ Λ′B→B˜ +
1
|C|2 − 1
(|C|2〈DK(τC)〉 − id)A ⊗ Λ′′B→B˜ (4.27)
for CP maps Λ′ and Λ′′ whose sum is TP. The effective map under the tagged
scheme is therefore
Λ˜t
A′B→A′B˜ = 〈ψ|T Λ˜AB→AB˜((·)⊗ ψT )|ψ〉T
+ Tr
[
(1T − ψT )Λ˜AB→AB˜((·)⊗ ψT )
]|⊥〉〈⊥|
= (idA′)A′→A′ ⊗ Λ′B→B˜
+
(|C|2〈(〈ψ|TDK(τC)|ψ〉T )A′ ⊕ β|⊥〉〈⊥|〉− idA′)A→A′ ⊗ Λ′′B→B˜|C|2 − 1
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with β = Tr [(1− ψ)TDK(τC)]. We would like to say that, unless the output
is the reject symbol, the effective map on A is the identity. We do not know,
however, what DK(τC) looks like. Therefore we apply a standard reasoning that
if a quantity is small in expectation, then there exists at least one small instance.
We calculate the expectation of Tr〈ψ|TDK(τC)|ψ〉T when the decomposition
A = TA′ is drawn at random according to the Haar measure,∫
Tr〈ψ|U†ADK(τC)UA|ψ〉TdUA = Tr
[(∫
UA|ψ〉T ⊗ 1A′ψU†AdUA
)
DK(τC)
]
=
Tr1A
TrΠacc
TrΠaccDK(τC)
≤ 1/|T |. (4.28)
Hence there exists at least one decomposition A = TA′ and a state |ψ〉T such that
γˆ := Tr〈ψ|TDK(τC)|ψ〉T ≤ 1/|T |. Define γ = max(γˆ, |C|−2). For the resulting
primed scheme, let
Λrej :=
(1− γ)|C|2
|C|2 − 1 Λ
′′ and Λacc = Λ′ +
γ|C|2 − 1
|C|2 − 1 Λ
′′ .
We calculate the diamond norm difference between the real effective map an the
ideal effective map,∥∥Λ˜t − id⊗ Λacc − 〈|⊥〉〈⊥|〉 ⊗ Λrej∥∥
≤ ∥∥id⊗ Λ′ + 1|C|2 − 1(|C|2〈(〈ψ|DK(τ)|ψ〉)〉− id)⊗ Λ′′ − id⊗ Λacc∥∥
+
∥∥〈|⊥〉〉〈⊥〉| ⊗ (1− γˆ)|C|2Λ′′/(|C|2 − 1)− 〈|⊥〉〈⊥|〉 ⊗ Λrej∥∥
≤ (1 + |C|−2)(|T |−1 + 2|C|−2)
= |T |−1(1 + (|A′||T |)−2)(1 + 2|A′|−2)
≤ 4|T |−1 (4.29)
as desired . uunionsq
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A Technical lemmas
In the following we state some technical Lemmas that we need in this article.
The proofs can be found in the full version [3].
Lemma A.1 Let XA→B ∈ L(HA,HB) be a linear operator from A to B. Then
XA→B |φ+〉AA′ =
√
|B|
|A|X
T
B′→A′ |φ+〉BB′ . (A.1)
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The next group of lemmas is concerned with entropic quantities.
Lemma A.2 Let Λ
(i)
A→A′ be CPTP maps and Λ
(i)
B→B′ , i = 1, ..., k CP maps for
i = 1, ..., k such that
∑
i Λ
(i)
B→B′ is trace preserving. Let Λ
(i)
AB→A′B′ = Λ
(i)
A→A′ ⊗
Λ
(i)
B→B′ and define the CPTP maps
ΛAB→A′B′C =
k∑
i=1
Λ
(i)
AB→A′B′ ⊗ |i〉〈i|C and
Λ′B→B′C =
k∑
i=1
Λ
(i)
B→B′ ⊗ |i〉〈i|C . (A.2)
Then
I(A′ : B′)Λ(%) ≤ I(A : B)% +H(C|A)Λ′(%) ≤ I(A : B)% +H(C)Λ(%) (A.3)
for any quantum state %AB.
The final lemma characterizes CPTP maps that are invertible on their image
such that the inverse is CPTP as well.
Lemma A.3 Let (τK , E,D) be a QES. Then the encryption maps have the
structure
(Ek)A→C = (Vk)ACˆ→C
(
(·)⊗ σ(k)
Cˆ
)
(Vk)
†
ACˆ→C , (A.4)
and the decryption maps hence must have the form
(Dk)C→A = TrCˆ
[
Πsuppσk (Vk)
†
ACˆ→C (·) (Vk)ACˆ→C
]
+
(
Dˆk
)
C→A
[(
1C −Πvalidk
)
(·) (1C −Πvalidk )] (A.5)
for some quantum states σ
(k)
Cˆ
, isometries (Vk)C→ACˆ , and some CPTP map Dˆk.
Here, Πvalidk = (Vk)ACˆ→C Πsuppσk (Vk)
†
ACˆ→C is the projector onto the space of
valid ciphertexts.
B Proof of characterization theorem
This section is dedicated to proving the characterization theorem for non-malle-
able QES, i.e., Theorem 4.4. We begin with two preparatory lemmas.
Lemma B.1 For any QES (τ, E,D) the map E := |K|−1∑kDk ⊗ETk satisfies
E (|φ+〉〈φ+|CC′(XC ⊗ idC′)) = |A||C| |φ+〉〈φ+|AA′(E†K(X)⊗ idA′)
This lemma is a consequence of the correctness condition and is proven in the
full version [3] of this article.
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Lemma B.2 Suppose (τK , E,D) satisfies Definition 4.2 for trivial B. Then
E := |K|−1∑kDk ⊗ ETk satisfies∥∥∥∥∥E(X)− |A||C|
[
〈φ+|X|φ+〉|φ+〉〈φ+|
+ Tr
(
Π−X
) 1
|C|2 − 1
(|C|2DK(τC)A ⊗ τA′ − φ+AA′) ]
∥∥∥∥∥

≤ 2
√
2ε|A|
(
2
√
|A||C|+ 1
)
. (B.1)
Proof. It follows directly from the fact that (τK , E,D) is a QES together with
Lemma A.1 that
E(φ+CC′) =
|A|
|C|φ
+
AA′ . (B.2)
Let Λ
(i)
C→CB˜1 , i = 0, 1 be two attack maps such that ηΛ(i) |φ
+〉 = 0 for i = 0, 1
and define
ΛC→CB˜1B˜2 =
1
2
∑
i=0,1
|i〉〈i|B˜2 ⊗ Λ(i).
The the ε-NM property implies
I(AA′ : B˜1B˜2)ηΛ˜ ≤ ε,
and therefore, using Pinsker’s inequality,∥∥∥∥∥12 ∑
i=0,1
|i〉〈i|B˜ ⊗ (ηΛ˜(i))CC′B˜1
− 1
4
∑
i=0,1
|i〉〈i|B˜ ⊗ (ηΛ˜(i))B˜1
⊗
∑
i=0,1
(ηΛ˜(i))CC′
∥∥∥∥∥
1
≤
√
2ε. (B.3)
Observe that
ηΛ˜ =
1
|K|
∑
k
Dk ◦ Λ ◦ Ek(φ+AA′)
=
|C|
|A|
1
|K|
∑
k
(
Dk ⊗ ETk
) ◦ Λ(φ+CC′)
=
|C|
|A| E ◦ Λ(φ
+
CC′). (B.4)
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Setting (ηΛ(0))CC′B˜1 = τ
−
CC′ ⊗ (ηΛ(1))B˜1 , we get
ηΛ˜(0) =
|C|
|A| E(τ
−)⊗ (ηΛ(1))B˜1
=
|C|
|A|
1
|C|2 − 1
(|C|2E(τCC′)− E(φ+CC′))⊗ (ηΛ(1))B˜1
=
1
|C|2 − 1
(|C|2DK(τC)⊗ τA − φ+AA′)⊗ (ηΛ(1))B˜1 . (B.5)
and therefore∥∥∥∥∥ 1|C|2 − 1 (|C|2DK(τC)⊗ τA − φ+AA′)⊗ (ηΛ(1))B˜1 − |C||A| E ((ηΛ(1))CC′B˜1)
∥∥∥∥∥
1
≤ 2
√
2ε (B.6)
for all Λ(1). For any state %CC′B˜1 with %CC′B˜ |φ+〉CC′ = 0, we define the state
%′
CC′B˜1B˜2
1
C
(
|0〉〈0|B˜2 ⊗ %CC′B˜1
+ |1〉〈1|B˜2 ⊗
[
((1C − %C)⊗ VC′)φ+ ((1C − %C)⊗ VC′)
]⊗ %B˜2). (B.7)
Here, V is a unitary such that Tr(1C − %C)V TC = 0. It is easy to see that such a
unitary always exists, the existence is equivalent to the fact that any |C|-tuple
of real numbers is the ordered list of side lengths of a polygon in the complex
plain. Note that %′
CC′B˜1B˜2
|φ+〉CC′ = 0, and %′C′ = τC′ . Together with the triangle
inequality, equation (B.6) implies therefore that
1
|C|
∥∥∥∥ |C||A| E(%)− 1|C|2 − 1 (|C|2DK(τC)⊗ τA − φ+AA′)⊗ %B˜1
∥∥∥∥
1
+
∥∥∥∥ |C||A| E [((1C − %C)⊗ VC′)φ+ ((1C − %C)⊗ VC′)]
−|C| − 1|C|
1
|C|2 − 1
(|C|2DK(τC)⊗ τA − φ+AA′) ∥∥∥∥
1
≤ 2
√
2ε,
i.e. in particular∥∥∥∥ |C||A| E(%)− 1|C|2 − 1 (|C|2DK(τC)⊗ τA − φ+AA′)⊗ %B˜1
∥∥∥∥
1
≤ 2
√
2ε|C|.
As % was arbitrary we have proven that∥∥∥∥ |C||A| E −
〈
1
|C|2 − 1
(|C|2DK(τC)⊗ τA − φ+AA′)〉∥∥∥∥

≤ 2
√
2ε|C|. (B.8)
The only fact that is left to show is, that ‖E(|φ+〉〈v|)‖1 is small for all normal-
ized |v〉 such that 〈φ+ | v〉 = 0. To this end, observe that TrA◦E(σC⊗(·)C′) = ETK
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for all quantum states σC . Let %C be any quantum state that does not have full
rank, note that such states span all of B(HC), and for hermitian operators there
exists a decomposition into such operators that saturates the triangle inequality.
Taking a quantum state σC such that 〈φ+|%⊗σ|φ+〉 = 1|C|Tr%CσTC = 0 (the first
equality is the mirror lemma A.1), we have
∥∥∥∥E(%⊗ σ)− |A||C| 1|C|2 − 1 (|C|2DK(τC)⊗ τA − φ+AA′)
∥∥∥∥
1
≤ 2
√
2ε|A|
according to what we have already proven. Using inequality (B.8) we arrive at
∥∥∥∥E†K(X)− |A||C|τATr(X)
∥∥∥∥
1
≤ 2
√
2ε|A|‖X‖1 (B.9)
For Hermitian matrices X and therefore∥∥∥∥E†K(X)− |A||C|τATr(X)
∥∥∥∥
1
≤ 4
√
2ε|A|‖X‖1 (B.10)
For arbitrary X. We can write |v〉CC′ = XC |φ+〉CC′ for some traceless matrix
XC . Now we calculate
∥∥E(∣∣φ+〉〈v|CC′)∥∥1 = ∥∥∥∥ |A||C| |φ+〉〈φ+|AA′ (E†K(X†))A
∥∥∥∥
1
=
|A|
|C|
∥∥∥(E†K(X))
A
|φ+〉AA′
∥∥∥
2
=
√|A|
|C|
∥∥∥E†K(X)∥∥∥
2
≤
√|A|
|C|
∥∥∥E†K(X)∥∥∥
1
≤|A|
3/2
|C| 4
√
2ε‖X‖1
≤4
√
2ε|A|3/2. (B.11)
The first equation is Lemma B.1, the sencond and third equations are easily
verified, the first inequality is a standard norm inequality, the second inequality
is Equation (B.10), and the last inequality follows from the normalization of |v〉.
By the Schmidt decomposition, we get a stabilized version of this inequality,
∥∥E(|φ+〉CC′ |α〉B˜1〈v|CC′B˜1)∥∥1 ≤2√2ε|A|3/2, (B.12)
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for all |α〉B˜1 and all |v〉CC′B˜ such that 〈φ+ | v〉 = 0 Combining everything we
arrive at ∥∥∥∥∥E(X)− |A||C|
[
〈φ+|X|φ+〉|φ+〉〈φ+|
+ Tr
(
Π−X
) 1
|C|2 − 1
(|C|2DK(τC)A ⊗ τA′ − φ+AA′) ]
∥∥∥∥∥

≤ 2
√
2ε|A|
(
4
√
|A|+ 1
)
. (B.13)
uunionsq
We are now ready to prove the characterization theorem Theorem 4.4 in the
ε-approximate setting (including the exact case, Theorem 3.7 by setting ε = 0.)
Theorem B.3 (Precise version of Theorem 4.4) Let Π = (τ, E,D) be a
QES.
1. If Π is ε-NM, then any attack map ΛCB→CB˜ results in an effective map
Λ˜AB→AB˜ fulfilling∥∥∥Λ˜AB→AB˜ − Λ˜exactAB→AB˜∥∥∥ ≤ 2√2ε|A|4|C|(4√|A|+ 1) , (B.14)
where
Λ˜exact
AB→AB˜ = idA ⊗ Λ′B→B˜ +
1
|C|2 − 1
(|C|2 〈DK(τ)〉 − id)A ⊗ Λ′′B→B˜ ,
with Λ′ = TrCC′ [φ+CC′Λ(φ
+
CC′ ⊗ (·))] and Λ′′ = TrCC′ [Π−CC′Λ(φ+CC′ ⊗ (·))].
2. Conversely, if for a scheme all effective maps fulfil Equation (B.14) with the
right hand side replaced by ε, then it is 5ε(log(|A|) + r) + 3h(ε)-NM, where
r is a bound on the size of the honest user’s side information.
Proof. We start with 1. We want to bound the diamond norm distance between
the effective map Λ˜ resulting from an attack Λ and the idealized effective map
Λ˜exact. Let
|ψ〉AA′BB′ =
|A|2−1∑
i=0
√
pi|αi〉AA′ ⊗ |βi〉BB′
be an arbitrary pure state given in its Schmidt decomposition across the biparti-
tion AA′ vs. BB′. We can Write |αi〉AA′ = X(i)A′ |φ+〉 for some matrices X(i) sat-
isfying ‖X(i)‖∞ ≤ |A|. We calculate the action of Λ˜ on |αi〉〈αj |AA′ ⊗|βi〉〈βj |BB′ ,
Λ˜exact
AB→AB˜(|αi〉〈αj |AA′ ⊗ |βi〉〈βj |BB′) = X
(i)
A′
(
|φ+〉〈φ+|AA′ ⊗ Λ′B→B˜(|βi〉〈βj |BB′)
+
1
|C|2 − 1
(|C|2DK(τ)A ⊗ τA′ − |φ+〉〈φ+|AA′)⊗ Λ′′B→B˜(|βi〉〈βj |BB′))X(j)A′ .
(B.15)
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In a similar way we get
Λ˜AB→AB˜(|αi〉〈αj |AA′ ⊗ |βi〉〈βj |BB′)
=X
(i)
A′ Λ˜AB→AB˜(|φ+〉〈φ+|AA′ ⊗ |βi〉〈βj |BB′)X(i)A′
=
|C|
|A|X
(i)
A′ ECC′→AA′ ◦ ΛCB→CB˜(|φ+〉〈φ+|CC′ ⊗ |βi〉〈βj |BB′)X(i)A′ . (B.16)
Using Lemma B.2 we bound∥∥∥(Λ˜AB→AB˜ − Λ˜exactAB→AB˜) (|αi〉〈αj |AA′ ⊗ |βi〉〈βj |BB′)∥∥∥1
=
∥∥∥X(i)A′ (Λ˜AB→AB˜ − Λ˜exactAB→AB˜) (|φ+〉〈φ+|AA′ ⊗ |βi〉〈βj |BB′)X(j)∥∥∥1
≤
∥∥∥X(i)∥∥∥
∞
∥∥∥X(j)∥∥∥
∞
∥∥∥(Λ˜AB→AB˜ − Λ˜exactAB→AB˜) (|φ+〉〈φ+|AA′ ⊗ |βi〉〈βj |BB′)∥∥∥1
=
∥∥∥X(i)∥∥∥
∞
∥∥∥X(j)∥∥∥
∞
∥∥∥∥ |C||A| ECC′→AA′ ◦ ΛCB→CB˜(|φ+〉〈φ+|CC′ ⊗ |βi〉〈βj |BB′)
− Λ˜exact
AB→AB˜(|φ+〉〈φ+|AA′ ⊗ |βi〉〈βj |BB′)
∥∥∥∥
1
≤2
√
2ε|A|2|C|
(
4
√
|A|+ 1
)
. (B.17)
The inequalities result from applying Ho¨lder’s inequality twice, and Lemma B.2,
respectively. Using the triangle inequality we get∥∥∥(Λ˜AB→AB˜ − Λ˜exactAB→AB˜) (|ψ〉〈ψ|AA′BB′)∥∥∥1
≤ 2
√
2ε|A|2|C|
(
4
√
|A|+ 1
) |A|2−1∑
i,j=0
√
pipj
≤ 2
√
2ε|A|4|C|
(
4
√
|A|+ 1
)
. (B.18)
As |ψ〉 was arbitrary, we have proven∥∥∥Λ˜AB→AB˜ − Λ˜exactAB→AB˜∥∥∥ ≤2√2ε|A|4|C|(4√|A|+ 1) . (B.19)
Now let us prove 2. Let ΛCB→CB˜ again be an arbitrary attack map, and
assume that the resulting effective map is ε-close to Λ˜exact
AB→AB˜ . Observe that
p=(Λ, %) = TrΛ′(%B).
By the Alicki-Fannes inequality [4] and Lemma A.2, this implies
I(AR : B˜)Λ˜(%) ≤ I(AR : B)% + h(p=(Λ, %)) + 5ε log(|A||R|) + 3h(ε) (B.20)
with the help of Lemma A.2. uunionsq
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